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Introduction
The imbroglio surrounding the migration debate in general and especially in Europe is far from being resolved. Migration scholars, pundits and policymakers alike are deeply divided over the responsibilities and the best concepts for analyzing or solving the issue of international migration. At the same time, all immigrant countries advocate the need for skilled labor and try to liberate entry hurdles for brainy immigrants. This is, in particular, the latest trend in fortress Europe. In Germany, for example, immigrants with a university degree can enter and work freely, and foreign students who finish their degree in Germany can stay if they find employment. France has recently adopted the concepts "immigration de remplacement" (demographic replacement migration), "immigration choisie" (selective immigration according to criteria), and "immigration concertée" (bilateral temporary guestworker programs) (Chojnicki et al., 2005; Banegas et al., 2007) .
Human capital is a critical input in the economic production function and skilled workers are very well compensated. Obviously, those who gain from this type of migration are the immigrants themselves and the host countries (brain gain). But where do the brainy skilled immigrants come from and what happens to the countries they leave behind? The answer is related to the term brain drain, coined by the British Royal Society in the 1950s. It refers to the permanent and non-replenished exodus of scientists, researchers and other highly skilled workers from developing countries to the USA and Canada. In its severe narrow form, brain drain deprives the often poor countries of origin of their most valued capital, that of educated, creative, talented and healthy individuals for whom the country of origin has paid to educate and provide. Naturally, the source country suffers a deceleration of economic development 1 .
The fiscal impact notwithstanding, the loss for the developing countries and the people left behind can also come in different forms and can be hard to measure. One example is the exodus of students who acculturate abroad and hardly ever return. In the late 1970s, about 105,000 Sub-Sahara African students were studying in only six Western European countries (Russell et al., 1990) . Another example is that many of these educated and skilled individuals could have an influence in the decision-making process of the government, could voice a healthy opposition, could also shape new ideas and give hope. In this case, the source country may be left politically vulnerable, victim of coup d'états, and various other ethnic conflicts. Hatton and Williamson (2002) argue that emigration from Africa will continue and match the early 1900s emigration of Europeans to the New World. Restricting African migration may be partially successful, but has unpleasant side effects such as social problems at home, a rising share of illegals, and increasing diplomatic problems between Africa and Europe.
Africa is a continent that could easily fit in the brain drain, migration and development literature. For the last couple of decades, about 20,000 Africans emigrate to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries each year (Adepoju, 2008) . Africa has the longest colonial experience than any other continent, and shares a history with Europe for many centuries. While the colonialism era officially ended in the 1960s, Europe still constitutes the first main destination for African migrants. In 2000, more than 60% of African migrants live in Europe, while only 31% live in North America (Lessault and Beauchemin, 2009 ). Defoort and Docquier (2007) find that if France conducts a selective migration policy that would induce a significant increase in the brain drain from North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, the OECD countries and, at a lower extent, South Asia.
knowledge accumulated abroad, the so called 'brain bank' (Agrawal et al., 2008) . Beneficial brain drain is even more likely when models account for consumer consumption. That is, the sending country's consumers benefit more by knowledge produced abroad by their countrymen than at home if the skilled emigrants had stayed. The benefit is greater the weak or more endogenized intellectual property rights are in the sending country (Kuhn and McAusland, 2006) .
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African migration to Europe may not strictly follow the neoclassical economic model of migrating that is based on wage differentials. Certainly, economic migrants typically seek better living conditions and want to improve their lives; logic would dictate that countries with the highest living standards would attract a disproportional number of migrants. However, the Scandinavian countries that offer the highest standards of living and the best material conditions in the world, do not receive a high number of African immigrants (Hooghe et al., 2008) . Using OECD and Eurostat data on the migrant inflow into European countries between 1980 and 2004, Hooghe et al. (2008) find that while migration flows react mainly to labor markets, cultural and colonial ties are equally important. 2 Docquier et al. (2007) also show that, inter alia, brain drain from all developing countries is strong where colonial links exist. Interestingly, while Beine et al. (2008) confirm that colonial ties are positive and significant for the exodus of skilled individuals from developing countries to all OECD countries, they do not find colonial ties to matter for the exodus of all individuals.
While African brain drain is of paramount importance for all economic actors and for the global economy and society, and while over the years there have been many studies on the subject mostly by political scientists very few studies have analyzed empirically African brain drain to the respective ex-colonial powers. The main reason is the non existence of adequate data or the existence of very fragmentary data. To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical work in the economic literature that has attempted to explain bilaterally why highly skilled
Africans leave their countries of origin to go to fortress Europe. While it is obvious and intuitive, and most experts acknowledge that there exists a long-term historic relation between the two continents, very few studies have examined the force of colonialism as a determinant of African migration to Europe.
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The present paper seeks to contribute to the growing literature on brain drain from developing nations by revisiting the different approaches adopted so far in the literature, and explicitly applying to the case of the fifty three states in the African Continent. Using recently available and reliable data on Africa's outflows into OECD countries, our main focus is the role of colonial linkages. While we test other theories and models, such as the gravity model, the neoclassical model, and the networks theory, we conjecture that the magnitude of the colonial vestige in that continent outweighs any other factors explaining the African brain drain.
The rest of the paper is set as follows. In section 2, we proceed with a brief literature review on the recent research contributions on brain drain from developing countries and we provide an overview of post-colonialism facts. In section 3, we describe our model and the data being used for this study. The empirical evidence is presented in section 4, and section 5 concludes.
Review of Migration Theories, Literature and Colonization

Theories of International Migration Movements
Overall, even though there is no consensus among researchers on the determinants of international migration, different theories attempt to address and explain the drivers of migration.
There are tangible and intangible drivers. Migration is also self-selective. Following Massey (1999), we provide an overview of the most prominent theories of migration in the social sciences. Neoclassical economic theories, like the famous "push-pull framework," have certainly dominated the literature over the last few decades; they have placed the labor markets in the heart of the movement. In 1970, the Harris-Todaro macro-model explained migration through geographic differences in the demand and supply of labor. As people leave areas of abundant labor and scarce capital to move to places of scarce labor and high wages to reap high returns, 6 wages equalize and the movement stops. Similarly, the micro-model of migration assumes a rational individual who maximizes utility and moves abroad because there are economic disparities (wages and jobs). As people move, the labor markets of the sending and receiving countries reach some equilibrium and migration subsides. Among several studies confirming migration due to wage differentials, Hatton and Williamson (2003) find that real wage gaps between Europe and the new world were one of the main forces of European emigration in the late nineteenth century.
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Every move entails monetary and psychic costs. When costs are much lower than the benefits then migration takes place; this is a cost-benefit analysis. The human capital model says that workers embody a set of skills that they can "rent" to employers. Workers invest in education, training, experience and health that make them more productive 4 and thus they command higher wages. Migration is also investment in human capital that increases productivity (Sjaastad, 1962) . Human capital theory predicts that skilled and talented workers, the young and the brightest will move first and will remain highly internationally mobile.
Undoubtedly, they move from areas of relatively low earnings to areas of high earnings.
Nonetheless, the push-pull framework has been subject to critiques. The main argument against this approach is that the concepts were developed in an industrial era, and as such they no longer offer the best perspective on migration in a post-industrial, globalizing world (Hooghe et al., 2008; Massey et al., 1998) .
The second strand of theory on international migration is the World System Theory. It centers upon the idea that there are dominant wealthy countries (core capitalist nations) and poor dependent countries (peripheral or semi-peripheral) and that global capitalism perpetuates these 3 Another force of emigration was demographic booms in the low-wage European sending regions. 4 With regards to the movement and productivity of world class workers, Hunter et al. (2009) -using the world's most-cited physicist's case -find that almost half of them live outside their country of birth and they move systematically in countries with large R&D spending. They also find that elite movers, on average, are not much productive than elite stayers. There is no evidence on whether migration improves scientists' productivity.
7 inequalities and reinforces a stratified economic order. Wage differentials are not important here.
Migration in this theory is a structural consequence of the expansion of markets within a global political hierarchy, and migration patterns reflect center/periphery to the center, in terms of linguistic dominance or cultural hegemony (Massey, 1999; Hooghe et al., 2008) . In other words, migrant flows are triggered when capitalist economic relations enter non-or pre-capitalist societies. There are various types of links between core capitalist countries and countries in the periphery such as enduring ideological, intellectual and cultural ties. The vestiges of colonization in the organization of the education system in former colonies, and specifically the dominance of European concepts in universities' structure of knowledge, is one of the factors contributing to the magnetism of the former colonies to their former colonial powers (Hooghe et al., 2008; Massey et al., 1998) . Even simple tourists visiting Africa could also ignite the desire to go abroad to the European country.
The presence of armed forces in the colonies or in the peripheries in general also triggers emigration from the poor countries to the core countries. (Hooghe et al., 2008) . In this regard, Massey (1999) points out that the penetration of capitalist economic relations into non-capitalist or pre-capitalist societies is today made possible by neocolonial governments and multinational firms that perpetuate the power of national elites who either participate in the world economy as capitalists themselves or offer their nation's resources to global firms on acceptable terms. In the past, however, this market penetration was assisted by colonial regimes that administered poor regions, like in Sub-Saharan Africa, for the benefit of economic interests in colonizing societies.
The third theory explaining emigration is the social capital theory emphasizing the central role of social networks that include relatives. It postulates that migrants are attracted by the fact that other migrants from the same ethnic group or country have already settled in the host country, which consequently allows for the occurrence of networks of recruitment (Hooghe et al., 2008; Massey et al., 1998) . Migrant networks come in the form of kinship, friendship, shared country of origin, etc. Networks, basically, lower the costs and increase the returns of migration. While networks have been acknowledged in the literature as powerful determinants of migration, it is not a priori certain that they also work for the skilled and educated group of migrants we are studying. It is possible that skilled migrants do not need networks because they 9 are educated and can find their own way. Note that while the previous two approaches claim to identify what essentially attract migrants to their destination countries, the networks approach explains emigration flows as well as it explains return and repeat migration. Notably, once migration has been initiated it can persist and be self-sustained due to cumulative causation (Massey et al., 1998) .
The New Economics of migration is another theory that considers the role of a variety of markets not just labor markets. The basic idea here is that migration is a household decision to minimize and overcome constraints of the family's consumption or production. it is positively affected by the presence of a common language and a common border; and it is a decreasing function of the distance between them. This model often very successful in predicting the flow of goods and services could also be used in migration to describe and predict the movement of individuals. In fact, the gravity model of migration is indeed used in urban geography. The idea is that -if we consider two cities -as the size or population of one or both of the cities increases, the movement of people will also increase between them, and the longer the distance between the two cities is, the lower the movement between them will be. This is often called "distance decay."
To test these theories, empirical scientists need good data. Lack of data in some countries or incomplete data in others have prevented migration researchers to adequately study the issue of brain drain. Carrington and Detragiache (1998) enormously across African countries, from 1% in Egypt for nurses to 81% in Liberia and from 5% for physicians in Equatorial Guinea to 75% in Mozambique, according to the occupation and country. They also find that the emigration of health professionals does not really differ from the emigration of other educated workers such as engineers, teachers, entrepreneurs, etc.
Colonialism and its Long-lasting Impact on Migration
The colonization era of European nations to most African countries officially ended around and Constant, 2005) . By the mid 1960s immigration from Sub-Saharan Africa marked its debut to
France. This mass migration created a serious shortage of housing in France (Constant, 2005) .
In the 1970s we observe a significant migration of people from Angola, Mozambique, 6 The departure of Europeans from Zaire, where over 80% of the commercialized production was controlled by them, had a detrimental effect on agriculture (Russell et al., 1990) . 7 Mozambique's port and railway sectors lost about 8,000 skilled and semi-skilled workers to Portugal; most of the plantation and factory owners, settler farmers, shopkeepers, government administrators, and professionals also immigrated to Portugal (Russell et al., 1990) . 8 France has also kept military bases in many of its ex-colonies along the Atlantic. French military readiness is executed by its 43 rd BIMA.
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The African brain drain to developed countries, with Western Europe being the main destination, has substantially increased over the last thirty years (Kohnert, 2007 and 18.6% respectively; from Central Africa it is 9.8 and 13.3% respectively; from Northern Africa it is 6.9 and 6.2% respectively; from Southern Africa it is 6.9 and 5.3% respectively (c.f. Kohnert, 2007; ECA, 2006; Docquier and Marfouk, 2004) .
The outflow of highly skilled Africans also constitutes a heavy financial burden to their respective native countries. UNCTAD estimates that the loss of an individual who has been educated in Africa costs the sending country on average USD 184,000 in terms of funds invested in that individual's education and training. Other detrimental effects include delaying the building up of an African middle class, the development of structures of the African civil society, which may consequently exert a negative impact on the political and economic stability of the countries of origin (Kohnert, 2007) .
To stave off the outflow of skilled and educated individuals in the 1980s, many SubSahara African countries practiced regulatory or restrictive policies (such as passport regulation and exit permits, and remittances requirements); delinking policies (such as employing nationals rather than expatriates); and incentive policies (such as providing attractive employment 14 conditions) (Russell et al., 1990) . Still rancor was present in both continents. At the same time geopolitical instability was also increasing. In the 1990s and beyond, some ex-colonial powers provided large amounts of capital in retribution (i.e. Germany to Namibia) and others signed bilateral treaties of migration (i.e. France with Senegal). The United Kingdom not only increased aid to the continent, but also pressured the G8 to write off debt from Africa and to devise a plan to take Africa out of its economic development quagmire. The United Nations also helped in capacity building.
The African brain drain, to the best of our knowledge, is an omission in the economics literature. It has been, however, widely debated in other social sciences (political science and sociology The economics literature on international migration distinguishes many potential determinants of brain drain. On the basis of the different theoretical approaches outlined in Section 2, including the gravity model, we select a group of independent variables that can best explain the migration flows from Africa to former colonial powers in Europe. First, we include the population of the host country to control for the simple fact that large countries will attract a larger number of migrants than smaller countries. All the variables are listed and explained in Table 1 .
Other variables following the push-pull and gravity models are the Gross Domestic there is a direct flight from the former ex-colony to the former ex-colonial power and nowhere else and zero otherwise. Naturally, direct flights should increase emigration flows to the respective ex-colonial power and away from other European countries.
We include the PPP in the origin country, because it indicates the cost of living and living standards of the country; it takes into account the relative cost of living and the inflation rates of different countries. We use PPP numbers from the WDI 2006. We expect to find that the higher the PPP is the lower the emigration flows are. Government expenditures growth in the country of origin is another variable that captures wealth and ample labor market opportunities in that country. The higher the expenditures, the more jobs may be available and earnings will increase, deterring people from moving abroad. We created this variable from the WDI 2006. Italy, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and those colonized by two colonial powers. The last dummy variable applies to the African countries that were a priori Independent (i.e. Liberia).
As others have suggested, if we believe in the cultural explanation of emigration, then it is inevitable that the ex-colonial powers will still attract migrants from their ex-colonies (Hooghe et al., 2008) .
To have a more "pure" variable for colonialism, we do not include language affinity in it.
In order to capture the importance of language affinity we created another dummy variable. This dummy variable takes the value one for the countries in Africa whose first official language is the same as the one of their former colonial powers. Language fluency of the ex-colonial power that is now the host country has been long found as a powerful determinant of the economic performance of immigrants (Chiswick, 2007) . With this variable we want to test the hypothesis that Africans who are fluent in a European language due to the fact that they learn it officially at school will be more likely to go to that country than to another country with a different language.
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The fourth set of independent variables is in line with the networks approach, which predicts that the presence of migrant communities in the host country or city facilitates and even perpetuates further immigration. In fact, in many European countries there are already immigrant enclaves that oftentimes even live in a parallel world to that of the natives. Potential migrants who know people in the destination country will be more likely to make the move than otherwise. Networks do not always need to be connected to the same family, village or country of origin. The power of networks comes also from the camaraderie that migrants have and the common plight they share in the host country as foreigners distinguished from natives. However, it is possible that network theory may not apply to the group of brainy migrants who may not need the network for help; skilled and talented migrants may rely on themselves, or connect with the natives in the host country for support. Lastly, while networks help immigrants, the network usually knows everything about everybody else. Perhaps some immigrants do not like to be exposed and "reported" back to the country of origin, especially if they come from a country with compromised civil liberties. Following previous studies, we include the stock of foreign population in the host country at each time period in our observation as a proxy for networks (Hooghe et al., 2008) .
Finally, we borrow a determinant of emigration from political science and political economy. Accordingly, people move because of civil and political rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom from any kind of discrimination, etc. Long after the independence waves in African countries in the 1960s, a considerable political metamorphose dominated many African countries in the last decade of the 20 th century. Namely, it was the introduction of "political pluralism" (Quantin, n.d.) . The political transition was sometimes accompanied by conflict and ending in violence. Onga'yo (2008) and abide by these measures inter alia (Adepoju, 2008; Ekpo, 1992; Khan and Knight, 1985; Guitan, 1981) . That is, they had to reduce the size of the public sector which in many countries is the leading source of jobs, adjust their currency, increase domestic interest rates, etc. We capture this effect of the SAPs on the African emigration by creating a dummy variable for countries under these external economic conditionalities. While in principle these programs should help, in fact they handicap most African economies and are a major cause of brain mobility. The failure of economic growth policies in most African countries is visible: low per capita income, severely limited access to fundamental needs regardless of multiple efforts to improve social welfare, high mortality rates, and deterioration of the terms of exchange. Through SAPs, the balance of payment crisis has led to high inflation and a trend towards decrease in real earnings (Dia, 2004) .
Consequently, most highly skilled workers do not think twice about leaving their home countries 20 to go abroad where they have brighter prospects and higher wages and can rely on a stable economic system.
Data
For this study we employ various sources of data. Migration flows of brainy Africans to the designated European countries in our analysis come from the bilateral data on gendered assessment of the brain drain by Docquier et al. (2008) . 9 They painstakingly compiled an aggregate 10 dataset to capture the bilateral emigration in the world by collecting census and registry data on the structure of immigration in all OECD countries. The dataset counts as migrants all working-age (25 and older) foreign-born individuals living in an OECD country.
This is an aggregate dataset on the stock of emigrants from all developing countries to OECD countries by level of schooling. By comparing the number of migrants to that of natives in the home country in the same education group, they calculate the emigration rate by educational attainment for two decades: 1990 and 2000. The dataset devotes special attention to data homogeneity and comparability.
This dataset presents several comparative advantages. First, it provides estimates of bilateral emigration stocks and rates by educational attainment and gender for 196 OECD countries over the period of 1990-2000, 11 therefore covering the migration rate and stocks of all fifty three countries on the African continent to the OECD countries in the dataset. For our present study, we select the bilateral migration (stock) of the fifty three states in Africa to seven European countries, which were former colonizers on the continent. We also look at the total migration stock of Africans to the respective country selected for our purpose. For the fifty three sending countries to the seven destination countries over the two time periods (1990 and 2000) , there were no missing observations, in theory yielding 742 (53 African countries x 7 European countries x 2 points in time) observations. Africans who have finished at least high-school are counted in our brain drain sample.
According to Docquier et al. (2008) , the construction of their dataset relies on three steps:
collection of Census and register information on the structure of immigration in all OECD countries, sum up over source countries; which allows for evaluating the stock of immigrants from any given sending country to the OECD area by educational attainment, and finally, compare the educational structure of emigration to that of the population remaining at home; allowing the computation of emigration rates by educational attainment in 1990 and 2000.
Calculating the brain drain as a proportion of the total educated labor force provides a better measure of the pressure imposed on the local labor market. The term emigration rate is thus used to refer to relative stock data and not to immigration flows.
As mentioned previously, the variables capturing the economic and labor market theories, as well as the networks approach (i.e. the stock of foreign population in the host country) are from the WDI (2006) database. The independent variables used to address the World Systems theory related to the colonial past were taken from different sources. The total number of inhabitants of the former colonial powers and the population of the host country are from the WDI (2006) database. The dummy variable categorizing the former colonial power was generated by using the classification made by Gieler (2007) and the CIA Factbook, and also the CEPII geographical data; we use these three different sources to double check the colonial footprint in each country in Africa. Boughton (2001) . The dummies for language commonalities structure are created based on the data from the CEPII geographical information dataset. Finally, the variable that captures the airfare system and network between Africa and Europe is created by using the actual route map of the major airlines from the respective ex-colonial powers operating in Africa. These route maps can be downloaded from their respective websites. For example, for France, we use the actual route map of Air-France,
for the United Kingdom we use British Airways, for Germany we use Lufthansa, and so on.
Results
Sample Characteristics
In Tables 2a-c, we present some colonization related facts between Africa and Fortress Europe. Table 2b portrays the language affinity to the ex-colonial power. Out of fifty three countries, thirty nine have adopted the language of their ex-colonial power as their first official language and still have it to this day. They represent about 74% on the continent. Language assimilation is mostly found in the Sub-Saharan region of Africa. In fact, thirty eight countries among the forty seven in this region (81%), share the same official language as their excolonizer. In twenty nine countries in the continent, the direct air transportation to access Europe is still provided by the national airlines of the former European colonizers. This presence of excolonial powers national airlines in Africa is highly observed in the Sub-Saharan countries with twenty seven countries relying on the former colonizer's airline compared to only two countries in the Northern part of the continent. France with Air France carries 51.72% of the direct flights from one major city in Africa to Paris Charles-De-Gaulle, making it therefore the biggest commercial carrier on the African continent. It is followed by the United Kingdom with British Airways (31.03%) and Belgium with Brussels Airlines (10.34%). Table 2c illustrates these statistics. Table 3 Looking at the PPP in Africa -in US Dollars -we see a tremendous increase in the decade by 210%. Assuming PPP depicts some economic well being, it is possible that this whopping change deterred more Africans from going to Europe. The last two remarks about the situation in Africa concern the existence of civil liberties and SAPs. It is noteworthy that on average, the score of the variable for civil liberties was about 5 in 1990 and it was also 5 in 2000.
It is disconcerting not only that Africa scored 5 in 1990 -indicating rather trampled civil liberties -but that it remained at this level of stifled freedom by the beginning of the new century. As for the SAPs, we notice no change between 19990 and 2000. As verified by other sources, 72% of Africa practices SAPs under the instructions of the global lenders.
In 
Robust OLS Results
The results of the robust OLS estimation are presented in Tables 5 and 6 . In Table 5 , we report the coefficient estimates of the potential factors determining migration in equation (1) In this estimation exercise we use one dummy variable for colonial power. The reference group is countries that were not colonized. Overall, the variance inflation factor is below the tolerated value. It is interesting to look at the coefficients on the constant term. They show that while skilled Africans from the northern regions are more likely to move to Europe, skilled Africans from the entire continent are not. There may be some unobserved or cultural differences that play a role and this warrants the separate estimations by region.
The estimates show that, overall, in Africa the colonial linkage is a very important determinant of the skilled African migration. In the model, brainy Africans are 72% more likely to move to their ex-colonial power country than those who are a priori from a not colonized or independent African country.
In addition, the established international airfare system in Africa, explained by the presence of ex-power national airlines in the respective ex-colonies, is also a key factor driving the exodus of high skilled Africans to Europe. The airfare variable unveils well the so far nonempirically investigated assertion made by Hooghe et al. (2008) . They, indeed, state that "communication and transportation lines are still being structured according to the colonial heritage. For example, direct flights from Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo) are still controlled by French and Belgian airlines companies, rendering it more plausible that citizens of Congo will arrive in France or Belgium, rather than in Germany or the UK." (p. 502).
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To our surprise however, the colonization variable has a negative sign for the SubSaharan region. Looking at the language assimilation variable the picture becomes more confusing. For example, for the entire continent, countries that have the same language as the European ex-colonizer are less likely to export migrants to that country. Yet for the Sub-Saharan region language assimilation is a very powerful determinant of emigration. Migrants from SubSaharan Africa are overwhelmingly more likely (72.3%) to head to their former colonial power based on the sharing of a common official language. While strange at first sight, this result is not so surprising. As mentioned earlier, more than 80% of the Sub-Saharan countries share the same official language as their former colonial powers. This indicates that immigrants from those countries have been 'assimilated' through the language link, therefore, crowding out to some extent the colonial argument as a key reason for migration into a specific country. Notably, this is the case of France's assimilation policy, whereby the French colonizers tried their best to convert "uneducated Africans" into citizens who understood the ideals of the French civilization (Jones, 2003) .
The empirical results further confirm that existing networks in the host country (with an elasticity between 0.4 and 0.5) are a key determinant of African brain drain. Networks remain an important positive determinant even when we split the sample by region; except that the coefficient for North Africa is not statistically significant, but still with the expected sign. This shows that brainy Africans value and rely on social and familial networks when they consider to move abroad. The estimates of GDP per capita in the host country, a pull factor and a gravity force, yield the expected sign. However, it seems to attract more skilled migrants from the northern part of the continent than from the other region. stand in an ancient tradition of circular migration where they intend to return to their country of origin after certain amount of money has been saved to buy some land, build a house, or start their own business. In sum, colonization and its correlates, along with networks and high GDP in the destination country are the only drivers that matter for the emigration of educated individuals in Africa.
Looking at the sub-regions in Africa, we find a few differences. SAPs in Africa constitute an important push factor of highly skilled Africans to Europe, but only for the Northern countries. Brainy people from North Africa whose country was under SAP's measures are 74% more likely to migrate to Europe. This confirms other scientists' findings that structural adjustments are a major cause of brain mobility because of their negative impact on African economies (Dia, 2004) . Namely, because of the enforcement of SAP policies, countries experienced a balance of payment crisis that led to high inflation and caused deterioration of real wages. While this deterioration applies to all natives, it is the highly skilled workers who would be more mobile and able to flee and thus they no longer resist the temptation to go abroad.
For the North African countries, the variable government expenditures growth is significant and has the right sign, indicating that the more the government invests in its country, the fewer people go abroad. Government expenditures such as spending on research or investments in the infrastructure of the country are actions that encourage skilled individuals to stay in their country. Civil liberties also matter in the Northern African countries (at the 5% level). This shows that the fewer liberties a country has, the less likely people are to leave the country. This is plausible because in very restrictive countries of dictatorship it is very difficult for people to leave even if they want to. The gravity hypothesis that a host country of larger size will attract more immigrants is not confirmed for the entire continent or for the sub-regions.
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In Table 6 , we present the empirical results from the re-estimated equation (1) that now has eight separate colonial dummy variables; the reference ex-colonial power is the United Kingdom. In this exercise, the coefficients on the constant term show a big difference between North Africa and Sub-Sahara Africa. If no other determinants are valid, we see that North
Africans will still exit to go to the ex-colonial powers in Europe. Sub-Sahara Africans on the other hand, would rather stay put and not migrate. Similar to results in Table 5 , the language variable is negative for the entire continent and positive for the Sub-Saharan countries. Likewise, the airfare dummy is highly significant and positive for both the entire continent and the Sub-Saharan region. This dependency of the African countries on European airlines for transportation is apparently a strong determinant of the emigration of skilled Africans to Europe.
Networks remain a significant magnet to the new host country for entire Africa and the sub-regional samples. This actually is very interesting because it indicates a never fading emigration. Networks will always exist in the host country, reinforcing the continuity of immigration and rendering immigration self-sustained and difficult to brake.
As expected, GDP per capita in the host country is also a powerful pull factor mainly in North Africa. All else equal, brainy Africans in general and northern Africans in particular care about a high standard of living and high production in the destination country and they are more likely to go where GDP per capita is higher. In this specification of Table 6 we find that PPP in the home country matters. It has a negative elasticity of 0.1, revealing that controlling for everything else, low standards of living in the home country push brainy Africans away to Europe. However, this is not significant in the sub-regions of the continent.
Our results also show that an increase in government expenditures growth deters the emigration of the highly skilled people in North Africa. Once again, an increase in SAPs triggers skilled emigration from North Africa to Europe, ceteris paribus. Trampled civil rights as in the case of a dictatorship make it more difficult for people to leave the country and go abroad. In sum, we find evidence that even thirty years after decolonization, ex-colonial powers play a role Lastly, our results also confirm that positive economic development and a strong or stable economy -either in the form of a high PPP, or high government expenditures, or no SAPs -in the African countries are powerful incentives for the brainy Africans to stay home.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
It has been widely described in the literature that since the 1960s when Africa acquired its independence from European colonialism, it is losing more than 20,000 of its skilled labor force to the OECD countries yearly (Adepoju, 2008) . It is also known that skilled and educated people are more likely to migrate and circulate around countries. They are the most mobile because of their demanded skills and because they command higher wages that they allow them the means to move easier. Note that depending on the circumstances and on the specific countries and occupations, brain drain may not always be detrimental to the origin countries. From this kind of migration, the migrants gain because they find better opportunities, jobs and remuneration in the destination country. The destination countries also gain when they receive skilled, healthy and educated workers, especially now when all developed countries are out to recruit the skilled migrants of the world. Some migration experts also argue that African migration will continue in big numbers over the next decades.
It is equally documented in the literature that Europe is the most favored destination of Africans. Given the long history that binds these two continents, the numbers certainly make 31 sense. In this paper we study the bilateral migration flow of highly skilled Africans to Fortress Overall our results confirm that the structure of the international airfare system in Africa propels emigration from the ex-colony to the ex-colonial power. The airfare system is a proxy of the role of distance according to the gravity model, but also of some remnants of colonialism.
The existence of networks in the destination country or in the ex-colonial power is a significant reason why Africans go to this particular European country. In the migration literature, and especially in sociology, it is long known and acknowledged that networks are important drivers of migration for all individuals. Here we find that the power of networks also applies to the highly skilled, talented and educated individuals.
The high standards of living in the destination country matter. Those European countries (among the ex-colonial powers) with high GDP per capita attract highly skilled Africans, who are, naturally, informed about job opportunities and the value of their human capital abroad. This applies to Africans from the Northern region. Therefore, brainy Africans do migrate for money.
Lastly, we also find evidence that SAPs trigger emigration from the North African region, but government expenditures and non existing civil liberties deter it. Airfare System Existence of a direct flight from an African country's major city to a city of its ex-colonial power and provided by an national airline of the ex-colonizer Population in the excolonies
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